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- CONFIDENTIAL -
TO: File 
FROM: Linda Gibbs 
RE: Summary of the Private Hearing on Ethics 
DATE: September 29, 1987 
Present at the hearing on Tuesday, September 22, 
1987 were Commissioners Ravitch, Friendly, Richland, 
Gribetz, Murphy, Macchiorola, O'Hare and Murray, and 
from the Commission staff Lane, Mauro, Dykstra, 
Sullivan and myself. Testifying were Powell Pierpoint, 
Chair of the Board of Ethics who spoke first and 
Kenneth Conboy" Commissioner of Investigation. Conboy 
was accompanied by Patrick Hoey of Department of 
Investigation. 
Questions and Answers 
A. Powell Pierpoint, Chair of the Board of Ethics 
Pierpoint did not make any opening comments. He 
mentioned that the revised code which has been 
submitted to the Commission has been sent to the three 
past Corporation Counsels-Norman Redlich, Alan Schwartz 
and F.A.O. Schwartz. While he has not heard from 
Redlich, both F.A.O. and Alan Schwartz have responded 
to him in agreement with these proposals. 
-1. Should the Board of Ethics have jurisdiction 
over all elected officials? 
The Board of Ethics does and should have 
jurisdiction over all elected officials. Under the 
former leadership of the City Council, an agreement had 
been made by Council leadership,with the Board of 
Ethics and the Corporation Council that the Council's 
Committee on Standard and Ethics would issue opinions 
for Council members and the Board of Ethics and 
Corporation Counsel would review them and either 
approve of disapprove. One such opinion was received 
which was approved. The current Council leadership 
does not recognize this agreement. 
2. Is the current structure of the Board 
appropriate if all elected officials are subject to its 
jurisdiction? 
- It would be a mistake to do away in the membership of 
Corporation Counsel and Director of Personnel (as 
recommended by Sovern commi~sion) . 
- The Commissioner of Investigation should be subjected 
to the advice and consent of the Council. 
- You are not going to solve the issue of corruption by 
restructuring the Board of Ethics. " The Board of 
Ethics basically is there to give comfort to the many 
honest people in government." 
- There are already enough investigative bodies in the 
City. 
3. What is the sUbject-matter jurisdiction of the 
Board of Ethics? 
The jurisdiction of the Board of Ethics is listed 
in 2602(a). The power to request DOl to undertake 
investigations for the Board includes all matters 
within their 2602(a) jurisdiction. 
4. What is the rationale behind the proposed 
three-tier categorization of employees, with increased 
behavioral restrictions as the categories increase? 
(Three-tiers are: (1) all employees, (2) "regular" 
employees -- those who receive sick and annual leave 
benefits, and (3) "regular" employees who are 
decision-makers) . 
- The Purpose is to ease the standards that presently 
apply to the lowest tier of employees so that 
prohibitions based purely on loyalty to the city would 
not apply. 
- Conflicts of interest only would continue to be 
prohibited for this lowest tier of employees. Current 
application is ludicrous in its results. (Gave example 
of school teacher who was prohibited from acting a life 
guard for a contractor who ran a city pool, because it 
would constitute "doing business" with another city 
agency. ) 
- Decision-makers," for the purpose of applying the 
third tier of employees, proposed code to should be 
identified by the agency head, but if there is a 
dispute on this issue, then the Board of Ethics should 
do it. 
5. Wouldn't the loosening of standards on the 
lowest tier open the door tb influence peddling (i.e., 
moonlighting attorney who is a member of the Queens 
Democratic club would then be allowed to represent 
private interests before another city agency whose 
employees also might include club members)? 
The concern is to avoid the silliness of the 
current application. But, you can have these 
situations, which would be very serious questions. 
6. Does the Commissioner of Investigation have 
the duty to report ethical violations to the 
appropriate district attorney? 
The Board of Ethics interprets the Code of Ethics; 
the Commissioner of Investigation does not. The 
Commissioner of Investigation just finds facts. 
Requests for findings to the Board of Ethics are 
satisfied on the representations made to the Board. If 
there are any further questions, the Board asks 001 to 
find out. 
7. What is the meaning of "advisory opinions"? Do 
they have any affect? 
They clearly became a defense in any criminal 
action against the official. 
8. Is the code of ethics in any way so 
restrictive as to discourage persons from accepting 
public employment? 
- This is a sUbstantial concern of the Board. · If ~u 
make standards too tough (particularly regarding 
financial disclosure and what employees are allowed to 
do when they leave city employment) you'll loose them. 
- Little benefit will result from strengthening the 
disclosure requirements. Not a bit of corruption was 
revealed by the financial disclosure by officials. The 
benefits of it now are that (1) it focuses the 
attention of the honest employees on what might be a 
conflict of interest, and (2) for the dishonest 
employees, it give the prosecutors another basis for 
conviction. 
- Only charges recommended are (1) . for a flat 
prohibition against former officials doing 
business within th~ agency they ser~ed for one year 
after leaving city service. (Currently applies only in 
respect to matters the official had personal dealings 
with), and (2) to consider how the city can control the 
activities of political party leaders. The revised 
code submitted deals with this in a modest way. The 
city should be able to go beyond this, to say who the 
city's employees should be allowed to listen to. 
B. Kenneth Conboy, Commissioner of Investigation. 
Conboy read to the commission his prepared remarks 
(copy attached). He followed these remarks by listing 
the names of 16 individuals whose activities are 
"examples of problematic behavior" which have occurred 
during the past 20 months, commenting that none of them 
have been charged with any wrongdoing. He alleges this 
is because under the current code of ethics it is 
impossible to determine what is ethical and what is 
unethical additionally, the current practices of the 
Board of Ethics give no coherent or sensible guidance 
on a statutes which is hopelessly ambiguous. 
1. What is the purpose of having a code of ethics 
which is a list of do's and dont's, rather than 
generally stated standards? 
Interpretation of the general standard becomes 
muddied and it is difficult to understand how it will 
apply. A code should not tolerate any conflicts if 
interest. It should be a series of bright-line rules 
which make very, very clear what the prohibitions are. 
2. It seems the Board of Ethics exists to inform, 
protect and caution employees about behavior entered 
into. Isn't this role undermined if the Board becomes 
an investigatory body? ~ 
- The Board of Ethics performs both advisory and 
investigatory functions. Currently, in practice, only 
two alternatives exist for employees who enter into 
unethical behavior: either the employee is fired by 
the Mayor for purely political reasons as there is an 
indictment and the person is charge with a crime. Most 
cases fall in between these processes. It is necessary 
to create a forum for someone, by objective review 
(preferably by a Board or Commission rather than 
internally by each agency) to make a judgement 
regarding these persons' benavior, and to impose some 
penalty by less than a criminal standard. There is a 
need for an adjudicative process in a non-criminal 
forum. 
- If the code were to become a clearly stated 
bright-line rule, then the Board of Ethics could 
continue to issue interpretative findings but it would 
additionally and primarily become a fact-finding body 
which would fit behavior into the prohibitions of the 
statue. There would quickly develop a body of 
precedent which would be cognizable, raise 
consciousness and accountability. 
- Currently, it is impossible to prosecute under the 
code. At least 12 cases have been sent to Morgenthau, 
who has said it is impossible to prosecute. As a 
minimum, you should eliminate ignorance of the law as a 
defense. 
- The Board of Ethics currently has the authority to 
make referrals to agency heads, but it does not do so. 
It can't, because it doesn't have the facts or the 
basis to make a factual judgement. There are no 
penalties at the agency level. 
3. If the Board holds both advisory and 
investigatory powers, what should its membership be? 
Haven't considered this. 
4. Should the Board have power over those beyond 
the executive branch? 
A difficult separation of powers issue. (No 
recommendation.) 
5. Should there be a forum where questions 
regarding conflicts of interest for elected officials 
can be litigated publicly? 
It would be useful, but there is a constitutional 
issue. It would be meddlesome to subject elected 
officials to such a non-conventional forum. 
6. A current charter provision which automatically 
terminates a person's city employment if they pleaded 
the 5th is unconstitutional. Courts have held public 
officers have no diminished rights under the 5th 
Amendment (Gary v. NJ., Broderick v. Gardner, 
Sanitation Assoc. v. NJ)). 
7. The Board of Ethics has recommended a revised 
code with increase behavioral restrictions on classes 
of employees as their status increase. Any response? 
It is a mistake to fragment power embodied in law 
for particular groups or categories of individuals. 
Having three categories with separate standards in 
unwise. 
The difference between salaried and unsalaried for 
the purpose of applying standards is not convincing; 
the issue is power. 
8. How often has the Board of Ethics requested 
you to undertake investigations? 
In my 1-1/2 year tenure as commissioner, only 
once have I made an investigation for the Board of 
Ethics; in that case I learned of a request for an 
opinion, which they were to issue. I knew that 
information presented to th~m in the matter was 
incomplete and that additional information showed that 
there was a real conflict of interest. I called the 
Board and suggested they send the information to me. 
without the call, the information would not have been 
considered by the Board and they would have issued a 
clean bill of health. The facts upon which each 
advisory opinion of the Board is based should be 
investigated, at least the big-ticket items, not the 
mundane little things. 
